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TAMING TECHNOLOGY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE PUBLIC 
ACCESS DOCTRINE: NEW JERSEY’S AMENDED RULE 1:38 
Kristin M. Makar∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
“Your scientists were so preoccupied with whether or not they 
could, they didn’t stop to think if they should.”
1
  This quote by Dr. 
Ian Malcolm, a character in Steven Spielberg’s thriller, Jurassic Park, 
describes the enthusiastic power of both discovery and innovative 
technological development, while cautioning against the dangers of 
technology.  Although public access to court documents via the In-
ternet does not begin to breach the subject of breeding dinosaurs, it 
does share the same pioneering spirit enveloping the technological 
possibilities of which Dr. Malcolm warned.  Similarly, the debate over 
public access to court records through the Internet, which is part of a 
larger debate regarding the intersection between law and technology, 
embodies an inherent conflict between technological capabilities on 
the one hand and moral, ethical, and legal limitations on the other 
hand.  In particular, because the Internet has the power to alter the 
public access doctrine by greatly expanding its capacity, it illuminates 
the legal tension between public access rights and individual privacy 
rights.  As the Internet changes the way that society envisions business 
and pleasure, state and federal courts, forced to act as experimenters, 
are reflecting on their public access procedures and reviewing poten-
tial changes. 
In July 2009, the Supreme Court of New Jersey amended New 
Jersey Court Rule 1:38
2
 by completely rewriting and revising the 
framework of the public access doctrine under former Rule 1:38.  
The amended Rule fundamentally alters the former Rule’s frame-
work and the public access doctrine itself because it presumes that all 
court records are open for public access with the exclusion of some 
 
 ∗ J.D. Candidate, May 2011, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., 2008, 
Gettysburg College.  I wish to thank Professor Robert Martin for his supervision and 
Seth Fersko for his comments and assistance. 
 1 JURASSIC PARK (Universal Pictures 1993). 
 2 N.J. CT. R. 1:38 (2009). 
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records contained in its comprehensive and exclusive list of excep-
tions.
3
  In effect, New Jersey courts will no longer struggle with the 
common law “balancing of the interests” test to determine when cer-
tain records should be available for public inspection because a pre-
sumption of openness applies unless the type of record is specifically 
addressed in the exceptions.
4
  More significantly, although the 
amended Rule does not address Internet accessibility explicitly in its 
provisions, the Supreme Court of New Jersey adopted the recom-
mendations of its self-appointed committee, the Special Committee 
on Public Access to Court Records (the “Committee”),
5
 which advo-
cate for the expansion of public access rights through remote elec-
tronic access to court documents.
6
 
The recommendations approved by the Supreme Court of New 
Jersey address the amended Rule’s failure to acknowledge Internet 
accessibility explicitly in its provisions.  Specifically, the recommenda-
tions, advising the court to create and periodically review its policies 
governing the posting of court documents on the Internet, permit 
the court to issue policy guidelines consistent with the presumption 
of openness motivating the amended Rule.
7
  This grant of discretion, 
combined with the ambiguity in the amended Rule itself, creates an 
opportunity for the court to consider the conflict between public 
access rights and individual privacy concerns when drafting its guide-
lines relating to Internet accessibility.  This necessarily invokes a re-
 
 3 See infra note 117 and accompanying text. 
 4 See infra note 117 and accompanying text. 
 5 SUPREME COURT OF N.J., ADMINISTRATIVE DETERMINATIONS BY THE SUPREME 
COURT ON THE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT SPECIAL 
COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC ACCESS TO COURT RECORDS 1 (July 22, 2009), available at  
http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/pressrel/AlbinCommitteeRule_138AdministrativeD
eterminations_by_the_Supreme_Court.pdf [hereinafter ADMINISTRATIVE 
DETERMINATIONS]. 
 6 See id. at 6 (adopting a policy of posting civil-docket and criminal-conviction 
information on the Internet and determining additional categories for posting in the 
future).  As of December 2010, the New Jersey Judiciary website did not maintain a 
mechanism to view court documents through remote electronic access, but it did 
provide information about locating specific documents in accordance with Rule 1:38.  
Copies of Court Records, N.J. COURTS, http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/superior/copies 
_court_rec.htm (last visited Dec. 25, 2010). 
 7 SUPREME COURT SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC ACCESS TO COURT RECORDS, 
REPORT OF THE SUPREME COURT SPECIAL COMM. ON PUBLIC ACCESS TO COURT RECORDS 
15 (2007), available at http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/publicaccess/publicaccess.pdf 
[hereinafter REPORT] (“Given the rapid changes in technology, the Supreme Court 
should determine on a periodic basis the appropriate court data for posting on the 
Internet and for release in bulk electronic form.  The Supreme Court should make 
those determinations on an administrative basis without amending the public access 
rule.”). 
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view of First Amendment and common law jurisprudence as the de-
bate over how courts should incorporate technology into the public 
access doctrine continues among scholars, courts, and the public. 
This Comment argues that the Supreme Court of New Jersey 
must consider certain consequences and unanswered questions 
raised by amended Rule 1:38’s alteration of the public access doctrine 
and pro-Internet initiatives, and it further proposes recommenda-
tions and solutions to these quandaries.  Four circumstances exist in 
which the amended Rule’s innovation raises perplexities.  First, the 
Rule requires the parties to redact any confidential personal identifi-
ers from documents submitted to the court, but it fails to provide an 
enforcement mechanism to punish a party’s lack of compliance.  
Second, Internet posting incentivizes parties to draft sealing motions 
to protect information that practical obscurity once protected, and 
the Rule’s strict sealing standard may force parties to make incom-
plete records or to turn to private forums for conflict resolution.  
Third, the timing of Internet release is undefined and raises ques-
tions about the Rule’s applicability to records created before the Rule 
became effective, as well as when the Rule requires courts to release 
the records during a case.  Finally, the question of creation and main-
tenance costs to support an Internet-user system is of particular con-
cern as the State’s debt continues to increase. 
Permitting public access to court documents in the courthouse is 
fundamentally different from widely publishing such information 
over the Internet.  This Comment does not advocate for a change in 
the traditional public access doctrine, but it argues only that courts 
treat remote electronic records differently than paper records.  With 
the understanding that the Supreme Court of New Jersey supports 
and intends to begin posting at least some of its court records on the 
Internet, this Comment offers guidelines that the Supreme Court of 
New Jersey should consider when drafting the appropriate policies 
governing Internet accessibility.  The recommendations proffered in 
this Comment focus on: drafting an enforcement provision to ensure 
compliance with the redaction requirements; restricting Internet 
access only to court-generated documents; limiting the release of 
court documents on the Internet to records created after the effective 
date of the amended Rule and not until the final disposition of the 
case; maintaining user fees to offset costs; and creating a log-in pro-
cedure before a court grants access.  Contemplation of these policy 
recommendations will help ensure the proper balance between pub-
lic access rights and individual privacy rights. 
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Part II of this Comment explains the history of the public access 
doctrine, in particular the sources of public access rights, decisions of 
the Supreme Court of the United States, and the underlying policy 
rationales for providing public access to court documents.  Although 
the founding constitutional principles for the public access doctrine 
and Supreme Court decisions often focus on the public’s right to at-
tend criminal trials, rather than directly on the public’s right to in-
spect criminal or civil court documents, lower courts have used the 
same rationale to extend the right to court documents and civil cas-
es.
8
  Part III examines the competing arguments over whether remote 
electronic access to court documents is more beneficial than harmful 
in the struggle between public access rights and individual privacy 
rights.  Part IV analyzes New Jersey’s former and amended Rule 1:38, 
which governs public access to court records, and it reviews the li-
mited New Jersey case law on the public access doctrine.  Finally, Part 
V addresses the possible consequences and unanswered questions 
raised by amended Rule 1:38, especially as they relate to the tension 
between protecting public access rights and individual privacy rights.  
Part V also recommends guidelines that the Supreme Court of New 
Jersey should consider when drafting its Internet policy in the face of 
a new and explicit presumption of openness. 
II. HISTORY OF THE PUBLIC ACCESS DOCTRINE 
The public access doctrine is deeply rooted in the historical no-
tion that trials are public events.  Courts support their determinations 
in favor of public access rights based on First Amendment and com-
mon law principles.  In several prominent cases, the Supreme Court 
of the United States has held that the public has either a First 
Amendment right or a common law right to access court proceedings 
and documents.
9
  Although the Court has never confronted the dis-
crete issue of remote electronic access to court documents, some of 
its opinions have alluded to the difficulty posed by advancing tech-
nology as it relates to the public access doctrine.
10
  In recent cases, the 
Court has acknowledged the concept of information privacy and the 
competing interests between public access rights and individual pri-
vacy rights.
11
  In an attempt to harmonize this tension, courts fre-
 
 8 See infra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 9 See infra Part II.B. 
 10 See infra Part II.B. 
 11 See infra Part II.B. 
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quently address the basic policy rationales that support an open judi-
cial process.
12
 
A. Sources of Public Access Rights 
Two sources provide public access rights: the First Amendment 
and the common law.  The First Amendment public access right is a 
fundamental right, which the government may limit only by demon-
strating a compelling governmental interest and a limitation that is 
narrowly tailored to serve that interest.
13
  The Supreme Court of the 
United States established a two-prong test to determine when a First 
Amendment right of public access attaches to court documents in a 
criminal proceeding—when the proceeding has historically been 
open to the public and public access promotes judicial integrity.
14
  Al-
though the Supreme Court has not applied this test in the context of 
public access to court documents in a civil proceeding, the circuit 
courts, including the Third Circuit,
15
 apply the same logic for civil 
proceedings.
16
 
The Supreme Court first recognized a common law right of 
access to court documents in Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc.
17
  
In contrast to the First Amendment right, which is subject to strict 
scrutiny,
18
 the common law right of access requires a balancing test 
that is easier to overcome with countervailing privacy interests.
19
  De-
 
 12 See infra Parts II.B, II.C. 
 13 Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 606–07 (1982) (“Where 
. . . the State attempts to deny the right of access in order to inhibit the disclosure of 
sensitive information, it must be shown that the denial is necessitated by a compel-
ling governmental interest, and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.”). 
 14 Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise II), 478 U.S. 1, 8–9 
(1986).  The Supreme Court originally articulated and explained the two prongs in 
Globe, 457 U.S. at 610–11 (applying the First Amendment test to a claim for public 
access to a criminal proceeding). 
 15 The Third Circuit is particularly notable because New Jersey is in the Third 
Circuit. 
 16 See Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1070 (3d Cir. 1984) (hold-
ing that the First Amendment right of access applies equally to criminal and civil tri-
als); see also Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 n.17 (1980) 
(“[H]istorically[,] both civil and criminal trials have been presumptively open.”).   
 17 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978). 
 18 Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 606–07 (1982). 
 19 See United States v. McVeigh, 119 F.3d 806, 812 (10th Cir. 1997) (“Further, 
both the common law and First Amendment standards ultimately involve a balancing 
test, and the First Amendment right of access receives more protection than the 
common law right.”); United States v. McDougal, 103 F.3d 651, 657–58 (8th Cir. 
1996) (noting that the strong presumption of access applies for a First Amendment 
access right but not for a common law right); Stone v. Univ. of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 
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spite the differences in the strength of the presumption and the de-
gree of difficulty in rebutting the presumption, most courts hesitate 
to decide the constitutional issue and instead elect to rely on the 
common law analysis.
20
 
B. Decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States Concerning the 
Public Access Doctrine 
The Supreme Court has never heard a case addressing the issue 
of remote electronic access to court documents.  To understand the 
current debate over Internet accessibility to court documents, howev-
er, one must explore the holistic development of the public access 
doctrine.  The modern public access doctrine developed when the 
Supreme Court decided several seminal cases in the 1970s and 1980s.  
In one of the earliest cases, Whalen v. Roe, the Court recognized a 
constitutional right to information privacy.
21
  Although the Court 
upheld a state statute requiring the storage of centralized computer 
files to record patient information, the Court framed the debate as: 
(1) the interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters and (2) the 
interest in independence in making important decisions.
22
  Perhaps 
more notably, in light of the modern debate regarding the intersec-
tion of law and technology, Justice Brennan, in his concurrence, 
noted that “[t]he central storage and easy accessibility of compute-
rized data vastly increase the potential for abuse of that information, 
and I am not prepared to say that future developments will not dem-
onstrate the necessity of some curb on technology.”
23
  The majority 
and the concurring opinions suggest that courts apply a different pri-
vacy right or a different level of privacy when electronic files are sub-
ject to public inspection and when dissemination of personal matters 
is more prolific. 
 
855 F.2d 178, 180 (4th Cir. 1988) (comparing the standards to overcome the right of 
access under the common law and the First Amendment).  
 20 Laurie Kratky Dore, Secrecy by Consent: The Use and Limits of Confidentiality in the 
Pursuit of Settlement, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 283, 320 (1999).  This proposition is con-
sistent with the concept of constitutional avoidance, which is the idea that courts will 
avoid determining the constitutionality of an issue unless no other alternative foun-
dation exists on which to make a decision.  See Cromwell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 
(1932) (“[E]ven if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal prin-
ciple that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly 
possible by which the question may be avoided.”).  
 21 See 429 U.S. 589, 605 (1977) (recognizing that the right to collect data for pub-
lic purposes is accompanied by a corollary duty to avoid unwarranted disclosures, 
and sometimes such a duty “arguably has its roots in the Constitution”). 
 22 Id. at 600–01. 
 23 Id. at 607 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
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In 1978, the Court decided a second case, Nixon, which recog-
nized a common law right of access to court documents but cau-
tioned that the right is not absolute, particularly when the individu-
al’s interest to restrict access outweighs the public’s interest.
24
  The 
Court pronounced that each individual court has supervisory power 
over its own records and that courts have the discretion to deny 
access when courts determine that documents may become a vehicle 
for improper purposes.
25
  After this decision, several federal courts 
began to recognize a common law right of access as creating a rebut-
table presumption in favor of public access to documents filed in 
connection with a pretrial motion.
26
  The circuit courts are split, how-
ever, as to the type of document to which the presumption attaches.
27
 
In the early 1980s, the Court decided two cases that focused on 
the First Amendment right of access to court proceedings but that al-
so informed the debate regarding public access rights in the context 
of court documents and civil proceedings.  In Richmond Newspapers, 
Inc. v. Virginia, the Court held that criminal trials must be open to the 
public under the protection of the First Amendment.
28
  In Globe News-
paper Co. v. Superior Court, the Court articulated the appropriate con-
siderations to determine when a First Amendment right of access ex-
ists for criminal proceedings: whether the proceeding has been 
 
 24 See Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 598, 610–11 (1978) (hold-
ing that the litigant’s individual interests to restrict access outweighed the common 
law public right to access tapes released during the trial). 
 25 Id. at 598.  The Court provided examples of when documents may become a 
vehicle for improper purposes, including promoting public scandal, encouraging 
libelous statements, or revealing harmful business information.  Id.   
 26 See F.T.C. v. Standard Fin. Mgmt. Corp., 830 F.2d 404, 409 (1st Cir. 1987) (ap-
plying the common law standard to financial statements introduced in an adjudica-
tory proceeding and permitting public access); Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Savs. Ass’n 
v. Hotel Rittenhouse Assocs., 800 F.2d 339, 344 (3d Cir. 1986) (applying the com-
mon law standard to settlement agreement papers and permitting access); In re 
Knoxville News-Sentinel Co., Inc., 723 F.2d 470, 476 (6th Cir. 1983) (applying the 
common law standard and permitting the removal of exhibits from the public court 
file to protect privacy and identity); Crystal Grower’s Corp. v. Dobbins, 616 F.2d 458, 
461 (10th Cir. 1980) (applying the common law standard to a party’s brief and keep-
ing it under seal).  
 27 Compare Leucadia, Inc. v. Applied Extrusion Tech., Inc., 998 F.2d 157, 164 (3d 
Cir. 1993) (holding that the mere filing of documents creates the presumption of 
public access), with United States v. Amodeo, 44 F.3d 141, 145 (2d Cir. 1995) (hold-
ing that the presumption applies only to documents used in adjudicating the case), 
and Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 805 F.2d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 1986) (holding that the pre-
sumption applies to those documents relevant to the functioning of the judiciary).  
 28 448 U.S. 555, 575, 581 (1980) (discussing the long history of open trials during 
the enactment of the First Amendment and holding that the criminal trial at issue 
must be open to the public). 
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historically open to the public and whether the right of access plays a 
significant role in the functioning of the judicial process.
29
  The Su-
preme Court rearticulated these considerations in a subsequent case 
regarding a claimed First Amendment right of access to court docu-
ments.
30
 
Finally, in the most recent case addressing the public access doc-
trine, United States Department of Justice v. Reporters Communication for 
Freedom of the Press, the Court held that a request for records stored by 
the government, rather than shedding light on the functioning of the 
government, was an unwarranted invasion of privacy.
31
  Although the 
Court decided the case under the Freedom of Information Act
32
 and 
the case did not directly pertain to court documents,
33
 the Court ad-
dressed privacy concerns related to the public access doctrine.
34
  The 
Court stated, “Plainly there is a vast difference between the public 
records that might be found after a diligent search of courthouse 
files . . . and a computerized summary located in a single clearing-
house of information.”
35
  The Court concluded that common law un-
derstandings of privacy include an individual’s control of information 
concerning his person.
36
  As in Whalen, the Court suggested that elec-
tronic records raise different concerns from traditional paper records 
in the context of privacy and the public access doctrine. 
C. The Rationale Underlying the Public Access Doctrine 
Five fundamental policy rationales exist to justify providing pub-
lic access to court proceedings and documents.
37
  These policy ratio-
 
 29 457 U.S. 596, 605–06 (1982).  This is often referred to as the “experience and 
logic” test.  Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise II), 478 U.S. 1, 9 
(1986). 
 30 See Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 8–9, 13 (applying the test to a claim for public 
access to court transcripts of a preliminary hearing and holding that the First 
Amendment right of access to criminal trials applies to preliminary hearings).   
 31 489 U.S. 749, 780 (1989) (holding that the invasion was unwarranted under 
the Freedom of Information Act because the request was not made to obtain official 
information about a government agency, but only to retrieve records stored by the 
government). 
 32 Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006). 
 33 Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. at 751, 780. 
 34 See id. at 764 (discussing the definition of privacy as information unavailable to 
the public and differentiating between scattered information and compiled informa-
tion in relation to privacy matters). 
 35 Id.  
 36 Id. at 763. 
 37 Peter W. Martin, The New “Public Court”: Online Access to Court Records—From 
Documents to Data, Particulars to Patterns, 53 VILL. L. REV. 855, 857–58 (2008). 
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nales guide courts in their analyses under both the First Amendment 
and the common law tests.  The principles are salient because they 
transcend technological differences and because they inform many of 
the arguments in favor of treating paper and remote electronic 
records equally. 
First, a policy endorsing public access guarantees that court pro-
ceedings are fair, enhancing public confidence in the judiciary.
38
  
Public confidence ensures judicial independence because increased 
transparency limits the prospect of public attack which may under-
mine judicial autonomy.
39
  Second, public access allows citizens to 
monitor and scrutinize the judiciary, administering judicial accoun-
tability to ensure proper judicial performance.
40
  Third, open access 
provides a forum for public concerns relating to crime, including an 
opportunity for the public to view courts dispensing justice properly 
to vindicate their concerns.
41
  Fourth, open access promotes public 
education about the functions and processes of the judiciary in its 
decision-making capacities.
42
  And fifth, public access ensures that the 
discussion of governmental affairs is an informed one and helps citi-
zens actively participate and contribute to their government to the 
extent that they understand how courts enforce society’s laws.
43
 
III. THE DEBATE OVER REMOTE ELECTRONIC ACCESS TO COURT 
DOCUMENTS 
The debate concerning electronic access penetrates the fore-
front of the public access doctrine because of the recent advances in 
modern technology.  Juxtaposed between First Amendment and 
common law rights and individual notions of privacy, the arguments 
 
 38 Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 570 (1980). 
 39 T.S. Ellis, III, Systematic Justice: Sealing, Judicial Transparency and Judicial Indepen-
dence, 53 VILL. L. REV. 939, 948 (2008). 
 40 Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 606 (1982). 
 41 Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise I), 464 U.S. 501, 508–09 
(1984). 
Criminal acts, especially violent crimes, often provoke public concern, 
even outrage and hostility; this in turn generates a community urge to 
retaliate and desire to have justice done.  When the public is aware that 
the law is being enforced and the criminal justice system is functioning, 
an outlet is provided for these understandable reactions and emotions. 
Id. 
 42 Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 587 (1976) (Brennan, J., concur-
ring) (“[F]ree and robust reporting, criticism, and debate can contribute to public 
understanding of the rule of law and to comprehension of the functioning of the en-
tire criminal justice system . . . .”). 
 43 Globe, 457 U.S. at 604–05. 
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supporting and opposing remote electronic access illuminate the 
broader debate over law and technology.  While these issues are not 
distinct from the landmark cases decided by the Supreme Court in 
the 1970s and 1980s, today’s courts must view the issue in light of im-
proving technology and the vast capabilities of the Internet. 
Prior to the 1990s, when the Internet began generating signifi-
cant usership, the general public could not retrieve data effortlessly 
with the click of a mouse.
44
  The modern Internet, with its capacity to 
disseminate information instantly worldwide, has been the source of 
significant legal debate.  In the public access area, the Internet has 
generated questions about the effect of advancing technology on pri-
vacy rights because it makes personal information immediately ac-
cessible, and despite this problem, courts are turning to the Internet, 
instead of the clerk’s office, to provide the public with access to court 
records.  More significantly, the debate over remote electronic access 
to court documents sheds light on just how far society is willing to 
engage the legal system in the technological phenomenon, perhaps 
ever so mindful of Dr. Malcolm’s heed. 
The proliferation of the Internet revolution has forced legisla-
tures, courts, and administrative agencies to devise laws, rules, and 
policies to address the role the Internet should play in administering 
justice.  The debate focuses on two discrete proposals for the treat-
ment of electronic records.  One ideology is to treat remote electron-
ic records the same as paper records and thereby ignore, or at least 
nullify, technological distinctions.
45
  The other position advocates li-
miting remote electronic access to court documents while maintain-
ing the complete paper record on file at the courthouse.
46
  This ap-
proach recognizes the different roles that technology plays in the 
legal system.  Advocates of both positions do not propose eliminating 
or reducing traditional public access to court documents, which 
would conflict with existing case law.
47
  Rather, the disagreement re-
sides in whether traditional notions of openness extend equally 
beyond paper records at the courthouse, protected to some extent by 
 
 44 MANUEL CASTELLS, THE INTERNET GALAXY: REFLECTIONS ON THE INTERNET, 
BUSINESS, AND SOCIETY 12, 16–17 (2001). 
 45 OFFICE OF JUDGES PROGRAMS, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, PRIVACY AND 
ACCESS TO ELECTRONIC CASE FILES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 9–10 (1999). 
 46 Id. 
 47 See supra Part II.B. 
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practical obscurity,
48
 to remote electronic records posted on the In-
ternet. 
A. Arguments in Favor of Equal Treatment of Paper and Remote 
Electronic Records 
Proponents advocating for equal treatment of paper and remote 
electronic records reject the idea that the Internet changes the legal 
landscape in the public access doctrine.  In effect, these proponents 
argue that the principle of openness inherent with paper records 
should evolve to include remote electronic records.
49
  The argument 
is predominantly one of increased judicial transparency,
50
 but suppor-
ters proffer several arguments involving issues of equality,
51
 public 
policy,
52
 attorney and client benefits,
53
 and administrative conveni-
ence.
54
  Given all of the arguments, the focus on equality is perhaps 
the most remarkable in light of the emphasis on fairness and equality 
offered in the American justice system.  The argument contends that 
equal treatment of paper and remote electronic records levels the 
playing field geographically, temporally, and indiscriminately for par-
ties and the interested public at large.
55
 
Public policy propositions often evoke the basic policy rationales 
that support public access to court documents and proceedings.
56
  For 
instance, proponents of equal treatment argue that remote electronic 
access offers the public the ability to aggregate and combine court 
 
 48 Practical obscurity refers to the idea that court documents remain open to the 
public to the extent that interested individuals are willing to travel to the courthouse, 
wait in line, search through records, and pay copying fees to access information.  Pe-
ter A. Winn, Online Court Records: Balancing Judicial Accountability and Privacy in an Age 
of Electronic Information, 79 WASH. L. REV. 307, 316 (2004).  
 49 See DAVID RAUMA, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., REMOTE PUBLIC ACCESS TO ELECTRONIC 
CRIMINAL CASE RECORDS: A REPORT ON A PILOT PROJECT IN ELEVEN FEDERAL COURTS 15 
(2003), available at http://ftp.resource.org/courts.gov/fjc/remotepa.pdf (comment-
ing that chief judges, clerks, and defense attorneys regard remote public access as 
reinforcing the idea that courts are an “open, public institution”). 
 50 See infra notes 58–59 and accompanying text. 
 51 See infra note 55 and accompanying text. 
 52 See infra notes 60–64 and accompanying text. 
 53 See infra notes 65–68 and accompanying text. 
 54 See infra notes 69–72 and accompanying text. 
 55 See RAUMA, supra note 49, at 15 (noting that equal access levels the playing field 
for attorneys who cannot easily access the courthouse); Lynn M. LoPucki, Court-
System Transparency, 94 IOWA L. REV. 481, 514 (2009) (arguing that equal access levels 
the playing field by making the same information available to all parties); Martin, su-
pra note 37, at 858 (suggesting that equal treatment ensures equal access for those 
unable to physically attend the proceedings). 
 56 See supra Part II.C. 
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data to stimulate public debate on important policy issues.
57
  Addi-
tionally, advocates insist that remote electronic access, because of its 
wide audience and transparency function, aids citizens in under-
standing the laws by which they are required to live.
58
  Similarly, re-
mote electronic access exposes and reduces corruption because the 
public is capable of monitoring the judiciary and imposing appropri-
ate accountability.
59
 
Advocates also advance several other public policy arguments.  
First, supporters assert that remote access to an electronic database 
helps promote due diligence and market research because of the 
ease with which information flows, which enhances the quality of 
business transactions and legal services.
60
  A second proposition con-
tends that the transparency achieved through remote electronic 
access demonstrates to legislatures how courts are implementing 
their laws and permits the legislatures to address and correct inter-
pretive discrepancies.
61
  Third, expansive public access through re-
mote electronic methods helps form and shape societal norms in the 
context of law and justice observed in courts.
62
  In particular, transpa-
rency has contributed to the condemnation of sexual harassment and 
domestic violence.
63
  Finally, some proponents argue that providing 
remote access to the public discourages data re-sellers from copying 
and selling the information online for profit, thereby undermining 
any privacy protections maintained for the general public.
64
 
 
 57 Compare Martin, supra note 37, at 859 (“Debate on important policy issues can 
also be aided by review of multiple cases of a particular type.”), with Globe Newspa-
per Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 604–05 (1982) (noting that public access 
promotes informed discussion and encourages citizen participation). 
 58 Compare LoPucki, supra note 55, at 484–85 (“It would expand the power of citi-
zens and legislators over the courts and make the actual rules that govern society vis-
ible to the public.”), with Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 587 (1976) 
(Brennan, J., concurring) (positing that public access educates the public about the 
laws and the judicial system). 
 59 Compare LoPucki, supra note 55, at 485 (arguing that transparency exposes and 
reduces corruption and provides a basis for the public to evaluate the judiciary), with 
Globe, 457 U.S. at 606 (mentioning that public access permits the public to monitor 
and scrutinize the judiciary). 
 60 Martin, supra note 37, at 868.  
 61 LoPucki, supra note 55, at 496–97. 
 62 Andrew D. Goldstein, Sealing and Revealing: Rethinking the Rules Governing Public 
Access to Information Generated Through Litigation, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 375, 383 (2006). 
 63 Judith Resnik, Uncovering, Disclosing, and Discovering How the Public Dimensions of 
Court-Based Processes Are at Risk, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 521, 536–37 (2006). 
 64 SUBCOMM. ON PRIVACY & PUB. ACCESS TO ELEC. CASE FILES, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE 
OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON COURT 
ADMINISTRATION AND CASE MANAGEMENT ON PRIVACY AND PUBLIC ACCESS TO 
MAKAR_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/16/2011  2:58 PM 
2011] COMMENT 1083 
In addition to public policy arguments, advocates of equal 
treatment highlight the benefits of remote electronic access for at-
torneys and their clients.  Remote electronic access reduces the price 
of legal services because electronic documents serve as a “form book” 
for attorneys to conveniently copy thereby saving time and effort.
65
  In 
fact, the argument extends beyond the mere cost advantages for legal 
services.  Remote electronic access reveals patterns to help attorneys 
predict the outcomes of litigation.
66
  Predictability has two benefits.  
First, predictability informs litigation strategy and facilitates settle-
ment based on expected outcomes.
67
  Second, and more broadly, 
predictability increases societal productivity by promoting private 
economic planning in accordance with the certainty of outcomes.
68
 
Finally, another set of arguments underscores the administrative 
convenience served by equal treatment.  In one instance, remote 
electronic access has the potential to reduce common errors made by 
attorneys by detecting missing information, redacting sensitive in-
formation automatically, and reminding attorneys about filing dead-
lines.
69
  This, of course, would require certain informational systems 
to create the appropriate functional technology.  In response to the 
opponents’ arguments about the cost to implement technologies and 
proper databases, proponents suggest outsourcing the labor and 
maintenance to private or public sector groups so as not to burden 
courts or the public.
70
  Advocates also highlight that both the federal 
courts and Congress have successfully embraced equal access of elec-
tronic and paper records through the E-Government Act of 2002
71
 
and the implementation of the Public Access to Court Electronic 
Records (PACER) system.
72
 
 
ELECTRONIC CASE FILES 7 (2001) (amended 2006) [hereinafter JUDICIAL CONFERENCE 
COMMITTEE]. 
 65 LoPucki, supra note 55, at 534. 
 66 Id. at 498–99. 
 67 Id. at 506–07. 
 68 Edward A. Morse, Reflections on the Rule of Law and “Clear Reflection of Income”: 
What Constrains Discretion?, 8 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 445, 456–57 n.52 (1999). 
 69 LoPucki, supra note 55, at 511.  
 70 Martin, supra note 37, at 880.  
 71 44 U.S.C. § 3501 (2006). 
 72 Gregory M. Silverman, Rise of the Machines: Justice Information Systems and the 
Question of Public Access to Court Records over the Internet, 79 WASH. L. REV. 175, 203 
(2004); see also Martin, supra note 37, at 864 (“The federal courts did not establish 
computer-based case management systems or subsequent electronic filing and doc-
ument management systems in order to provide the public with better access to court 
records.  Those systems were created because they offered major gains for judges and 
court administrators.”). 
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B. Arguments in Favor of Restricting Remote Electronic Access to Court 
Documents 
Opponents of equal treatment for paper and remote electronic 
records recognize that there is something inherently dissimilar about 
the methods of access to court documents.  The disparities between 
paper records and remote electronic records involve several issues, 
including administration and cost, public safety, and litigation, dis-
crimination, and privacy concerns.  Opponents do not necessarily ob-
ject to a policy permitting remote electronic access to court docu-
ments in its entirety, but rather, they argue that unfettered access is 
undesirable.  While many of the arguments focus on the unique 
problems of remote electronic access, other concerns are present 
with respect to paper records as well, and these concerns may be fur-
ther exacerbated in the electronic context. 
One significant argument for opponents, which is also one of 
the most difficult questions posed to proponents of equal access, is 
the question of the cost of the technological infrastructure required 
to maintain electronic databases that provide remote access to the 
public.  The cost issue expands beyond the necessary technological 
equipment and addresses certain labor concerns, such as converting 
paper files to electronic files and hiring personnel to provide security 
and maintenance for the databases.
73
  The cost issue has intensified as 
legislatures and courts determine whether to charge the public for 
remote electronic access, and if so, how to establish fee systems.
74
  
Aside from monetary costs, remote electronic access to court docu-
ments raises concerns about the administrative burdens of physically 
providing access to databases and the increased opportunities for 
clerical error and data-entry mistakes.
75
  The questions of administra-
tive burdens, accountability, and responsibility become important 
with the introduction of redaction requirements into the public 
access doctrine. 
 
 73 MARTHA WADE STEKETEE & ALAN CARLSON, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS & THE 
JUSTICE MGMT. INST., DEVELOPING CCJ/COSCA GUIDELINES FOR PUBLIC ACCESS TO 
COURT RECORDS: A NATIONAL PROJECT TO ASSIST STATE COURTS 8 (2002) [hereinafter 
CCJ/COSCA GUIDELINES]. 
 74 See Victoria S. Salzmann, Are Public Records Really Public?: The Collision Between the 
Right to Privacy and the Release of Public Court Records over the Internet, 52 BAYLOR L. REV. 
355, 375–76 (2000) (discussing the dilemma states face as they determine how to 
provide electronic access to the public). 
 75 See id. at 375 (“Although clerical error has long been dealt with by the courts, 
the introduction of computer technology brings forth a renewed opportunity for da-
ta entry mistakes.”). 
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Opponents also make several arguments highlighting how re-
mote electronic access compromises public safety.  For example, one 
concern is that the public, fearful of the release of private informa-
tion over the Internet, might hesitate to comply with the govern-
ment.
76
  This is particularly apparent in two different circumstances.  
First, it raises a possibility that victims and witnesses will hesitate to 
come forward and citizens will be unwilling to serve as jurors.
77
  
Second, access to sensitive information may result in decreased sus-
pect cooperation, which in turn could increase the number of cases 
that proceed to trial in lieu of disposal through plea agreements.
78
  
An additional public safety concern posits that remote electronic 
access to personal information increases and eases the opportunity 
for mischievous viewers to commit identity theft.
79
  Furthermore, post-
ing court records on the Internet may entice blackmail, stalking, ex-
tortion, and other crimes that threaten public safety.
80
 
Opponents also focus on litigation concerns generated with a 
policy allowing remote electronic access to court documents.  One 
concern is that posting court records on the Internet will burden 
courts further because of increased litigation by parties raising mo-
tions to seal records or requesting protective orders to shield their 
private information from public viewing.
81
  A second concern intro-
duces the possibility that Internet posting might increase pretrial 
publicity and taint the jury pool, which would perhaps prejudice the 
parties’ right to a fair trial.
82
  As advanced technology enhances com-
munication through wireless networks and smart phones, serious ap-
 
 76 Id. at 377. 
 77 Winn, supra note 48, at 328–29.  
 78 See Letter from Michael A. Battle, Dir., Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys, U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, to James C. Duff, Sec’y, Judicial Conference of the U.S. (Dec. 6, 
2006) (suggesting that placing documents online creates a “cottage industry” that 
republishes court records on websites exposing cooperators and leads to targeting 
witnesses, intimidation, harassment, and retaliation). 
 79 Winn, supra note 48, at 317. 
 80 Lynn E. Sudbeck, Placing Court Records Online: Balancing Judicial Accountability 
with Public Trust and Confidence: An Analysis of State Court Electronic Access Policies and A 
Proposal for South Dakota Court Records, 51 S.D. L. REV. 81, 83 (2006). 
 81 See Winn, supra note 48, at 326 (arguing that federal courts may experience in-
creased litigation demanding motions to seal or protective orders under the PACER 
system). 
 82 See George F. Carpinello, Public Access to Court Records in New York: The Experience 
Under Uniform Rule 216.1 and the Rule’s Future in a World of Electronic Filing, 66 ALB. L. 
REV. 1089, 1108 (2003) (discussing the problems of pretrial publicity and tainting the 
jury pool on the parties’ right to a fair trial, particularly in cases that generate signifi-
cant public attention). 
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prehension about jurors accessing the Internet and case information 
prior to or during trials creates cause for concern.
83
 
A fourth point of contention addressed by opponents regarding 
the consequences of permitting remote electronic access to court 
documents concentrates on discrimination.  Opponents argue that 
remote electronic access may promote inequality because litigants 
with the resources to resort to private judicial forums will have the 
option to do so, particularly if they have sensitive privacy concerns, 
while the remaining public must choose to either forego justice or li-
tigate in the public courts.
84
  This represents the phenomenon of the 
“vanishing trial” and recognizes the potential for an increase in liti-
gants seeking alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mechanisms.
85
  In 
fact, there may be a correlation between the expanding public access 
doctrine and the increase in contracts drafted with mandatory arbi-
tration clauses to avoid public disclosures, and such clauses are po-
tentially harmful to consumers.
86
 
Another discrimination concern raises the idea that widespread 
availability of court information over the Internet may encourage 
employers and other entities to search and ultimately discriminate 
based on information present in the court documents.
87
  For exam-
ple, ChoicePoint Inc., a private company, has compiled and aggre-
gated data on millions of individuals from various public records, 
which the government and employers use to screen and investigate 
 
 83 Mary Flood, Windows Opening and Doors Closing—How the Internet is Changing 
Courtrooms and Media Coverage of Criminal Trials, 59 SYRACUSE L. REV. 429, 431 (2009); 
John Schwartz, As Jurors Turn to Google and Twitter, Mistrials Are Popping Up, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 18, 2009, at A1. 
 84 See Lewis A. Kaplan, J., S.D.N.Y., Litigation, Privacy and the Electronic Age, 4 YALE 
SYMP. L. & TECH. 1 (2001) (discussing the growing dissatisfaction with privacy me-
chanisms in the public courts, particularly in the electronic age, and the competing 
privacy benefits of alternative dispute resolution methods for those who can afford 
it); Winn, supra note 48, at 328–29.  
The world of cyber-justice should not be permitted to degenerate into 
a world . . .  where the rich can seek out private judicial forums to re-
solve their disputes, while the poor and middle classes are faced with 
an impossible choice—either foregoing justice to maintain their priva-
cy and security; or permitting their sensitive personal information to be 
commercialized or stolen, and allowing the intimate details of their 
personal lives to be made available all over the Internet. 
Id. 
 85 Nancy S. Marder, From “Practical Obscurity” to Web Disclosure: A New Understanding 
of Public Information, 59 SYRACUSE L. REV. 441, 444–45 (2009). 
 86 Id. at 445–46. 
 87 James B. Jacobs, Restorative Justice: Mass Incarceration and the Proliferation of Crim-
inal Records, 3 U. ST. THOMAS L. J. 387, 394, 401–02 (2006). 
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current and prospective employees.
88
  Although the question of how 
ChoicePoint accessed this information in the past remains unclear, 
whether it accessed information through paper or electronic records, 
one can only imagine that remote electronic access to court docu-
ments will hasten and simplify the task. 
A final area of concern relates to privacy rights and reaches the 
core of the First Amendment and common law disputes over the pub-
lic access doctrine.  Much of the conflict between proponents and 
opponents of remote access reveals the tension between public access 
rights and individual privacy rights.  The question of privacy protec-
tion permeates all areas of law but is particularly controversial, espe-
cially with modern technology, in this area of information privacy.  In 
Whalen, the Supreme Court of the United States indicated that priva-
cy includes the interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters.
89
  
More significantly, the Court suggested that the duty to avoid unwar-
ranted disclosures “arguably has its roots in the Constitution.”
90
  Addi-
tionally, in Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, the Court noted 
that common law understandings of privacy include the premise that 
an individual has control over information concerning his person.
91
  
The struggle to define the appropriate balance between privacy and 
public access rights is even more ambiguous because the Supreme 
Court held that every court has supervisory power over its own 
records.
92
 
One of the more significant privacy concerns that opponents 
raise to justify differential treatment focuses on the decline of prac-
tical obscurity.
93
  More specifically, the practical obscurity of court 
records combined with the physical limitations of paper composition 
and storage capabilities creates an expectation of privacy that withers 
away with electronic records that are potentially available forever.
94
  
Arguably, this expectation of privacy due to practical obscurity and 
past technological limitations made additional protections for infor-
 
 88 Daniel J. Solove, Modern Studies in Privacy Law: Notice, Autonomy and Enforcement 
of Data Privacy Legislation: Access and Aggregation: Public Records, Privacy and the Constitu-
tion, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1137, 1151 (2002). 
 89 Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599–600 (1977). 
 90 Id. at 605. 
 91 United States Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 
489 U.S. 749, 763 (1989). 
 92 Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 598 (1978). 
 93 See discussion supra note 48. 
 94 Id. at 316–17 (discussing a new concern in the electronic age about escaping 
the past and burying skeletons in the closet only for them to resurface many years 
later in an Internet search).   
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mation contained in court documents unnecessary—nonetheless, as 
the Internet continues to change the shape of communications, op-
ponents argue that the time has come to revisit Justice Brennan’s fo-
rewarning in Whalen and to reexamine the meaning of privacy and 
methods to ensure adequate privacy protection.
95
 
Practical obscurity also serves an important role in minimizing 
the potential damage resulting from a mistake in the record.  When 
records on the Internet contain mistakes, courts and citizens do not 
have the means to undo the damage.
96
  With paper records, viewer-
ship is limited; however, with online dissemination, the chance that 
millions of people will have access to the information before parties 
and courts correct it is significantly greater.
97
  Even if the responsible 
parties eventually correct the mistake, the courts and Internet viewers 
may have electronically stored and further disseminated incorrect 
versions.  According to opponents, the risk of mistakes and Internet 
dissemination is disturbing because many individuals appear in court 
records involuntarily.
98
  Generally, non-litigants do not have the op-
portunity to defend allegations and their reputations before the court 
to protect their interests.
99
 
Providing remote electronic access to court documents also 
threatens individual privacy by providing viewers with the opportunity 
and ability to easily aggregate and disseminate information gleaned 
from online court documents at low costs, leading to the potential 
commercialization of court records.
100
  The advancements made poss-
ible by the Internet encourage privatization of public information by 
enterprises engaged in the lucrative data-mining industry.
101
  Al-
though the data-mining industry evolved before the Internet and 
 
 95 See Whalen, 429 U.S. at 607 (Brennan, J., concurring); see also supra notes 48, 94 
and accompanying text. 
 96 Marder, supra note 85, at 446–47. 
 97 Id. 
 98 See Natalie Gomez-Velez, Internet Access to Court Records—Balancing Public Access 
and Privacy, 51 LOY. L. REV. 365, 410 (2005) (arguing that people required to appear 
in court often do not willingly volunteer to participate in a public process).  This ar-
gument may be less compelling for litigants, who arguably consent to publicizing 
their information presented in the court and who may have some control over what 
information is, in fact, presented. 
 99 Carpinello, supra note 82, at 1107. 
 100 See Winn, supra note 48, at 316 (“Information in many different locations can 
be combined and aggregated in ways that previously were impossible, permitting en-
tirely new uses of the information that could never have been intended before.”). 
 101 See Gomez-Velez, supra note 98, at 378, 415–16 (discussing the virtual privatiza-
tion of public information and vendor interest in reselling information found in 
court records). 
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electronic recordkeeping came to fruition, posting court documents 
online will increase the ease with which such information is accessed 
and aggregated. 
C. Committee Reports and Positions 
As courts and legislatures confront the intersection of technolo-
gy and the public access doctrine, various committees have circulated 
guidelines and reports in response to the quandary.  Two committees 
in particular have issued influential and conflicting reports: the Judi-
cial Conference Committee on Court Administration and Case Man-
agement on Privacy and Public Access to Electronic Case Files (“JCC 
Guidelines”)
102
 and the Conference of Chief Justices and the Confe-
rence of State Court Administrators (“CCJ/COSCA Guidelines”).
103
  
Although the Committees’ advocate opposing positions, both Com-
mittees recognize that the judiciary must deny remote electronic 
access to certain records in some instances. 
The JCC Guidelines recommend that in civil cases, the public 
should have equal access to both paper and electronic documents.
104
  
This recommendation aligns with the proponents’ position advocat-
ing for equal treatment of paper and electronic records.
105
  With re-
spect to criminal cases, however, the JCC Guidelines stipulate that the 
public should not have remote electronic access to such cases at 
present.
106
  The recommendations suggest that the Committee revisit 
the issue if the Committee learns that the benefits of public access 
 
 102 The special Subcommittee was formed upon the request of the Judicial Confe-
rence of the United States to its Committee on Court Administration and Case Man-
agement directing an examination of the public access doctrine.  JUDICIAL 
CONFERENCE COMMITTEE, supra note 64, at 1.  The Subcommittee consisted of seven 
judges and one attorney.  Id.  Congress created the Judicial Conference of the Unit-
ed States to initiate and review policies governing the administration of the federal 
courts.  Judicial Conference of the United States, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
judconf.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2011). 
 103 This project combined the efforts of the Justice Management Institute, the 
State Justice Institute, the Conference of Chief Justices, the Conference of State 
Court Administrators, the National Association of Court Management, and the Na-
tional Center for State Courts.  CCJ/COSCA GUIDELINES, supra note 73, at vi.  These 
bodies endeavored to complete a comprehensive review of state court policies per-
taining to the public access doctrine, ultimately drafting the Guidelines to provide a 
model policy for states to adopt.  Id. 
 104 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE, supra note 64, at 6.  As an exception, the JCC 
Guidelines recommend that Social Security cases be exempted from remote elec-
tronic access.  Id. 
 105 See supra Part III.A. 
 106 Id. at 8. 
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significantly outweigh the dangers.
107
  The Committee reasoned that 
safety concerns in criminal cases, including risks to cooperative de-
fendants and law enforcement personnel, outweigh public access 
rights.
108
 
In contrast to the JCC Guidelines, the CCJ/COSCA Guidelines 
assert that courts should restrict certain documents from online 
access based on the nature of the information.
109
  The CCJ/COSCA 
Guidelines recommend excluding contact information, Social Securi-
ty numbers, account numbers, graphic photographs, medical records, 
family law records, abuse-and-neglect records, and names of minor 
children.
110
  In this respect, the Committee agrees with the oppo-
nents’ arguments by advocating for differential treatment of paper 
and electronic records.
111
 
IV. NEW JERSEY’S RESPONSE TO REMOTE ELECTRONIC ACCESS  
TO COURT DOCUMENTS 
Just as state and federal courts across the nation addressed their 
public access doctrines in the face of changing technologies, New Jer-
sey took action to review its rule governing public access to court 
documents.  Amended Rule 1:38 represents a fundamental change in 
the public access doctrine as compared to the former Rule’s frame-
work because it endorses a presumption of openness unless ex-
empted.  Although the amended Rule’s provisions do not address In-
ternet accessibility explicitly, the Committee’s recommendations, 
adopted by the New Jersey Supreme Court, discuss the gradual evolu-
tion of remote electronic accessibility.  Consistent with the Rule’s 
transformation, existing New Jersey case law advances a presumption 
of open access to court proceedings and documents. 
A. Former and Amended Rule 1:38 
Similar to courts and legislatures in other jurisdictions, New Jer-
sey has recently considered the arguments in support of and against 
permitting remote electronic access to court documents.  In 2006, 
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of New Jersey charged the 
 
 107 Id. 
 108 Id. 
 109 CCJ/COSCA GUIDELINES, supra note 73, at 1 (“The nature of certain informa-
tion in some court records, however, is such that remote public access to the infor-
mation in electronic form may be inappropriate, even though public access at the 
courthouse is maintained.”). 
 110 Id. at 40. 
 111 See supra Part III.B. 
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Supreme Court Special Committee on Public Access to Court 
Records (the “Committee”) to conduct a comprehensive review of 
New Jersey’s rules regarding public access to court records.
112
  This 
was not the first time that the court addressed technology’s ability to 
transform the public access doctrine.  In 1994, the Information Sys-
tems Policy Committee, in conjunction with a special subcommittee 
on public access, issued a report that the court adopted in 1996.
113
  
The report concluded that, because electronic information is as pub-
lic as paper records, court information should be available online.
114
  
At the time, however, technological limitations created obstacles to 
posting court information on the Internet.
115
 
Now that technological advancements offer a practical solution 
to previous obstacles preventing remote electronic access, New Jersey 
unsurprisingly reevaluated its public access laws.  This time, the court 
focused its assessment on Rule 1:38, which governs the public access 
doctrine in New Jersey.  Pursuant to the Committee’s report and rec-
ommendations, the supreme court adopted amended Rule 1:38 on 
July 22, 2009, which became effective on September 1, 2009.
116
  The 
changes from former Rule 1:38 to amended Rule 1:38 are significant 
and represent a fundamental change in New Jersey’s public access 
doctrine.
117
 
Former Rule 1:38, as compared to the amended Rule, was nar-
row and incomplete.  Former Rule 1:38 defined court records availa-
ble for public access as only those records that were “required by sta-
tute or rule to be made, maintained or kept on file by any court, 
office or official within the judicial branch.”
118
  The Rule proceeded 
 
 112 Letter from Barry T. Albin, Associate Justice and Chair of the Supreme Court 
Special Committee on Public Access to Court Records, Supreme Court of New Jersey, 
to Stuart Rabner, Chief Justice, Supreme Court of New Jersey, at i (Nov. 29, 2007), 
available at http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/publicaccess/publicaccess.pdf [hereinaf-
ter Letter from Justice Albin to Chief Justice Rabner]. 
 113 REPORT, supra note 7, at 26–27. 
 114 Id. 
 115 Id. 
 116 ADMINISTRATIVE DETERMINATIONS, supra note 5, at 1. 
 117 See REPORT, supra note 7, at 9 (“This approach [amended Rule 1:38] is a signif-
icant departure from the current version of Rule 1:38 . . . .  The proposed rule is in-
tended to replace the common law ‘balancing of interests’ test with an absolute right 
of access to all non-exempt court and administrative records.”).  Under the former 
Rule, if a request for access fell outside the scope of Rule 1:38, the requester would 
have to assert a common law right of access claim and the court would have to bal-
ance the parties’ interests.  Id. at 34.  Under the amended Rule, an absolute right ex-
ists unless explicitly exempted.  Id.  
 118 N.J. CT. R. 1:38 (1969) (amended 2009) (“All records which are required by 
statute or rule to be made, maintained or kept on file by any court, office, or official 
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to list ten exceptions for records exempted from public access.
119
  De-
spite the listed exceptions, several other exceptions were scattered 
throughout the court rules, statutes, and case law.
120
 
In contrast to former Rule 1:38, amended Rule 1:38 attempts to 
address many of the inadequacies and inconsistencies plaguing New 
Jersey’s public access doctrine.  The Committee undertook its review 
with the general presumption that court records are open to the pub-
lic.
121
  In fact, the amended Rule presumes that court records are 
open to the public unless exempted, and the amended Rule codifies 
all of the allowable exceptions to this presumption.
122
  The amended 
Rule’s policy statement pronounces that court records “within the 
custody and control of the judiciary are open for public inspection 
and copying except as otherwise provided in this rule.”
123
  While the 
exceptions to this general presumption of openness are numerous, 
the amended Rule indicates that “[e]xceptions enumerated in this 
rule shall be narrowly construed in order to implement the policy of 
open access to records of the judiciary.”
124
 
 
within the judicial branch of government shall be deemed a public record and shall 
be available for public inspection and copying, as provided by law, except . . . .”). 
 119 N.J. CT. R. 1:38 (a)–(j).  The exceptions excluded personnel and pension 
records, criminal, family, and probation records, completed jury questionnaires and 
the preliminary lists of jurors, records required to be kept confidential under statute, 
rule, or court order, records pertaining to pretrial intervention programs, cases ap-
proved for mediation, reports by judges that are submitted to the Administrative Di-
rector of the Courts, records maintained by the Judicial Performance Committee, 
and certain discovery materials relating to pre-indictment discovery, prearraignment 
conferences, plea offers, arraignment/status conferences, pretrial hearings, and pre-
trial conferences.  Id. 
 120 Letter from Justice Albin to Chief Justice Rabner, supra note 112, at i. 
 121 Id.; see also REPORT, supra note 7, at 25 (“An open and transparent court system 
is an integral part of our democratic form of government.”). 
 122 Letter from Justice Albin to Chief Justice Rabner, supra note 112, at i. 
 123 N.J. CT. R. 1:38-1 (2009).  Court records are defined as:  
(1) any information maintained by a court in any form in connection 
with a case or judicial proceeding, including but not limited to plead-
ings, motions, briefs and their respective attachments, evidentiary ex-
hibits, indices, calendars, and dockets; (2) any order, judgment, opi-
nion, or decree related to a judicial proceeding, (3) any official 
transcript or recording of a public judicial proceeding, in any form; (4) 
any information in a computerized case management system created or 
prepared by the court in connection with a case or judicial proceeding; 
(5) any record made or maintained by a Surrogate as a judicial officer. 
N.J. CT. R. 1:38-2. 
 124 N.J. CT. R. 1:38-1.  For the most part, the various exceptions in the amended 
Rule embody all of the exceptions listed in the former Rule, along with additional 
provisions.  Compare N.J. CT. R. 1:38 (a)–(j) (1969), with N.J. CT. R. 1:38-3 (a)–(f) 
(2009).  It is worth noting how a rule that provides for more exceptions to access can 
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Two significant departures from the former Rule to the 
amended Rule involve the amended Rule’s mandatory redaction of 
confidential personal identifiers (“CPIs”) and the sealing procedure.  
Amended Rule 1:38 requires parties to redact CPIs from any docu-
ments submitted to the court, including Social Security numbers, 
driver’s license numbers, vehicle plate numbers, insurance policy 
numbers, active financial account numbers, and active credit card 
numbers.
125
  Additionally, the amended Rule explicitly establishes a 
standard for sealing court records by codifying the common law test 
of good cause.
126
  More so, amended Rule 1:38 also provides for the 
unsealing of court records by motion and places the burden on the 
non-movant to prove that good cause to continue sealing the record 
still exists.
127
  Former Rule 1:38 made no direct reference to redaction 
requirements for confidential information or sealing and unsealing 
procedures. 
Although the provisions in amended Rule 1:38 do not address 
Internet posting explicitly, the Committee’s recommendations, ulti-
mately approved by the supreme court, suggest that the judiciary con-
sider posting court documents on the Internet.
128
  The fundamental 
change from former Rule 1:38 to the creation of a presumption of 
openness unless exempted in amended Rule 1:38 fuels the question 
of how far this presumption carries in the context of Internet posting. 
Notably, the Committee emphasized that not all records are appro-
 
still result in greater access.  The exceptions in the amended Rule are the only re-
strictions placed on public access in the universe of court records.  The former Rule 
mandated public access only to records required to be made or maintained by the 
judiciary and further restricted access by providing for exceptions.  
 125 N.J. CT. R. 1:38-7(a) (2009).  The Rule permits that an “active financial account 
number may be identified by the last four digits when the financial account is the 
subject of the litigation and cannot otherwise be identified,” or, in the case of other 
personal identifiers, when statutes, rules, administrative directives, or court order re-
quires such identifying information to remain in the documents.  N.J. CT. R. 1:38-
7(b).  The Rule does not require a party to redact a driver’s license number that the 
New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission requires to be included in documents relat-
ing to the suspension and reinstatement of licenses.  N.J. CT. R. 1:38-7(e). 
 126 N.J. CT. R. 1:38-11(a)–(b).  The Rule defines good cause as when “(1) 
[d]isclosure will likely cause a clearly defined and serious injury to any person or ent-
ity; and (2) [t]he person’s or entity’s interest in privacy substantially outweighs the 
presumption that all court and administrative records are open for public inspection 
pursuant to R. 1:38.”  N.J. CT. R. 1:38-11(b) 
 127 N.J. CT. R. 1:38-12. 
 128 See REPORT, supra note 7, at 14 (“As resources permit, the Judiciary should de-
velop and implement a public access system whereby records are made available over 
the Internet without charge.”).  The recommendations suggest that Internet posting 
begin with civil docket and criminal conviction information.  Id. 
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priate for online dissemination.
129
  In particular, the recommenda-
tions acknowledge that “there is a difference between releasing elec-
tronic records in response to a specific request and actively publish-
ing those records on the Internet.”
130
  Furthermore, the Committee 
recognized the tension between public access rights and individual 
privacy rights and stated that “[b]ecause of privacy concerns, the Ju-
diciary should proceed cautiously with Internet posting after further 
study.”
131
 
The Committee’s report specifies particular areas where diffe-
rential treatment of paper and remote electronic records is advisable.  
One area involves the content of the information posted on the In-
ternet.  The recommendations propose that courts exclude an indi-
vidual’s full date of birth and home address and include only the 
birth year and the municipality and state of residence for remote 
electronic records, but not for paper records available at the court-
house.
132
  The Committee reasoned that differential treatment was 
appropriate because of concerns about identity theft with mass proli-
feration of sensitive information over the Internet.
133
  Another area 
where unequal treatment evolves is in the type of records permitted 
for online posting.  For instance, the Committee advised against post-
ing family and municipal docket information on the Internet at 
present until courts conduct further analysis.
134
  Additionally, the rec-
ommendations advocate for Internet posting of conviction-only crim-
inal-docket information.
135
  The Committee expressed concern about 
courts publishing information in the case of wrongly accused and 
overcharged defendants whom the courts have found not guilty.
136
 
The Supreme Court of New Jersey responded to the Commit-
tee’s report by approving a majority of the recommendations under-
lying the amendments to Rule 1:38, including all of the recommen-
 
 129 Id. at 12–13 (“[N]ot all electronic records should be posted on the Internet.”). 
 130 Id. at 14 (“Internet posting results in a hyper-dissemination of court records, 
raising concerns different from those related to specific requests for court records.”). 
 131 Id. 
 132 Id.  
 133 Id. at 35. 
 134 REPORT, supra note 7, at 14.  The recommendations do not specify who should 
conduct further analysis, although the Committee did recommend that the Adminis-
trative Director appoint a permanent Advisory Committee on Public Access.  Id. at 
59.  The Administrative Director and the Advisory Committee would work with the 
supreme court to address future concerns regarding public access to court docu-
ments.  Id. at 9–10. 
 135 Id. at 15. 
 136 Id. at 54–55. 
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dations involving remote electronic access.
137
  The court did, however, 
modify and reject some of the other recommendations that were un-
related to Internet access, which complicates the predictability of fu-
ture outcomes in disputes regarding the public access doctrine and 
interpretations of the amended Rule.
138
 
B. New Jersey Court Decisions 
Traditionally, New Jersey courts have determined that the public 
has a broad right to inspect court documents, although cases address-
ing the public access doctrine itself are relatively rare.  The cases that 
concentrate on the public access doctrine rely on a common law right 
of access claim, and courts have made their decisions based on the 
common law “balancing of the interests” test.  Accordingly, the case 
law primarily involves balancing the parties’ interests in the context 
of sealing motions and does not readily rely on former Rule 1:38 as a 
decision-making tool.
139
  Nonetheless, understanding the roots of the 
public access doctrine in New Jersey is important to assess the poten-
tial future impact and consequences of the amended Rule. 
In New Jersey, the Legislature recognized the public right to at-
tend judicial proceedings as early as the 1677 Concessions and 
Agreements of West New Jersey.
140
  In 1879, the New Jersey Supreme 
Court acknowledged the existence of a public right to inspect court 
 
 137 See ADMINISTRATIVE DETERMINATIONS, supra note 5.  The full supreme court re-
viewed the Committee’s report and subsequently drafted its Administrative Determi-
nations concerning the Committee’s recommendations. 
 138 Id.  For instance, the court broadened the presumption of openness by reject-
ing the Committee’s recommendation that complaints alleging indictable and disor-
derly person offenses be deemed confidential.  Id. at 7.  But the court also narrowed 
the presumption by modifying the recommendation concerning financial records of 
guardians and requiring that such records remain confidential as to unrelated par-
ties.  Id. at 7–8. 
 139 For reasons why, see supra note 117 and accompanying text.  Recently, the New 
Jersey Supreme Court relied on Rule 1:38 to justify eliminating the initial pleadings 
exception to the fair-report privilege in defamation cases because the exception con-
tradicted the Rule’s principles and purpose with respect to expanding public access 
to filed pleadings.  Salzano v. North Jersey Media Group Inc., 993 A.2d 778, 790 (N.J. 
2010). 
 140 Hammock v. Hoffman-Laroche, Inc., 662 A.2d 546, 553 (N.J. 1995); see generally 
1677 Concessions and Agreements of West New Jersey, reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR 
LIBERTIES 188 (Richard L. Perry ed., American Bar Foundation, 1959) (“That in all 
publick courts of justice for tryals of causes, civil or criminal, any person or persons, 
inhabitants of the said Province may freely come into, and attend the said courts, and 
hear and be present, at all or any such tryals as shall be there had or passed, that jus-
tice may not be done in a corner nor in any covert manner.”). 
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documents when it awarded a citizen the right to inspect tax records 
subject to litigation.
141
 
The leading case on the public access doctrine in New Jersey is 
Hammock v. Hoffman-Laroche, Inc.
142
  In Hammock, the New Jersey Su-
preme Court held that there was a common law presumption of pub-
lic access to court documents, and the court established a reasona-
bleness standard to determine when a party properly rebuts the 
presumption.
143
  The court noted that the presumption applies to all 
materials filed with the court if they are relevant to any material issue 
in the case.
144
 
After the Hammock decision, the lower courts indirectly ad-
dressed the presumption of open access in the context of Internet 
accessibility.  In Smith v. Smith, the court warned that “[l]ooming 
technological developments may warrant the judiciary to reconsider, 
prospectively, the current balance of interests in favor of open court 
proceedings.”
145
  The court emphasized that technology permits re-
mote research by “prospective employers, business associates, loan of-
ficers, government regulators, social clubs, and perhaps even would-
be Saturday night dates.”
146
  Nearly five years later and with the aid of 
amended Rule 1:38, the time has come for the judiciary to determine 
 
 141 Ferry v. Williams, 41 N.J.L. 332, 339 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1879). 
The present controversy relates to a matter of public police of univer-
sally recognized importance, concerning a traffic which, in the opinion 
of many, largely adds to the disorders of society and the burdens of 
taxation; and it cannot be alleged that private interests are not as much 
involved in its due regulation by law as they are in other public ques-
tions about which heretofore individuals have maintained a standing in 
this court. 
Id. 
 142 662 A.2d 546, 546 (N.J. 1995). 
 143 Id. at 556.  The court outlined that the need for secrecy must be specific to 
each document and must be based on a current justification for privacy protection.  
Id. at 559. 
 144 Id. at 558–59. 
 145 879 A.2d 768, 775–76 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2004).  “It is not hard to im-
agine that each scurrilous allegation contained in some court filing could eventually 
turn up in a ‘Google search.’”  Id. at 775. 
 146 Id. at 775.  In a recent decision, the Supreme Court of New Jersey declared that 
the plaintiff did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in conviction informa-
tion, despite an expungement order, because court documents are widely dissemi-
nated and available for public access over the Internet.  G.D. v. Kenny, A-85 (Sep-
tember Term 2009), 2011 N.J. LEXIS 87, at *39–40 (N.J. Jan. 31, 2011) (“The 
expungement statute—enacted at a time when law enforcement and court docu-
ments may have been stored in the practical obscurity of a file room—now must 
coexist in a world where information is subject to rapid and mass dissemination.”). 
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how technology will alter the balance between public access rights 
and individual privacy rights.
147
 
V. UNANSWERED QUESTIONS AND CONSEQUENCES RAISED BY 
AMENDED RULE 1:38 AND PROPOSED ANSWERS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
Amended Rule 1:38 does not reference Internet access to court 
documents explicitly.
148
  This ambiguity challenges any assessment of 
the future impact of the Rule as it relates to the public access doc-
trine.  The recommendations promulgated by the Committee and ul-
timately approved by the Supreme Court of New Jersey manifest that 
Internet accessibility will come to fruition in the near future.  As 
courts transition to posting documents on the Internet, however, sev-
eral unanswered questions and consequences remain.  Many of these 
consequences echo the concerns of those advocates in favor of plac-
ing restrictions on Internet access.  Because amended Rule 1:38 fun-
damentally alters the former Rule and leaves the future of Internet 
accessibility to the discretion of the supreme court,
149
 New Jersey may 
face some unique obstacles as it embarks on its quest to provide re-
mote electronic access to the public.  Fortunately, by leaving a majori-
ty of the implementation policies open to further analysis and review, 
the court can create guidelines to ensure compliance with the rec-
ommendations and the founding principles of amended Rule 1:38 
while simultaneously balancing necessary individual privacy protec-
tions. 
A. The Necessity for an Enforcement Provision Appended to the 
Redaction Requirements 
One gap in amended Rule 1:38 that must be addressed pertains 
to the redaction of confidential personal identifiers (CPIs).
150
  The 
 
 147 See infra note 149 and accompanying text.   
 148 The recommendations state that, “[t]he statute should not include references 
to any specific technology, given the rapidly changing technological environment in 
which the courts operate.”  ADMINISTRATIVE DETERMINATIONS, supra note 5, at 9. 
 149 Id. at 6–7 (“Given the rapid changes in technology, the Supreme Court should 
determine on a periodic basis the appropriate court data for posting on the Internet 
. . . .  The Supreme Court should make those determinations on an administrative 
basis without amending the public access rule.”).  Whether the supreme court will 
view this proclamation as merely a discretionary grant of power or as a responsibility 
to remain pro-active and vigilant when monitoring the policy remains unclear.  The 
language of the statement, particularly the word should, appears to support the latter 
interpretation. 
 150 See N.J. CT. R. 1:38-7 (2009) (“A party shall not set forth confidential personal 
identifiers as defined in R. 1:38-7(a) in any document or pleading submitted to the 
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Rule does not include an enforcement provision for attorneys and 
parties who fail to redact.  Proper compliance with this provision be-
comes especially important as the court implements guidelines and 
policies to govern the dissemination of information on the Internet.  
Because of the wide audience and their ability to easily view court 
documents on the Internet, the inadvertent release of confidential 
information, such as a Social Security number or an active financial 
account number, could be devastating to the victim.
151
  The court, by 
approving the recommendations and provisions of amended Rule 
1:38, recognized the importance of concealing such confidential in-
formation from public access in both paper and electronic records.
152
 
 Amended Rule 1:38 places the burden of redacting CPIs on at-
torneys and parties as opposed to court personnel.
153
  The Rule re-
quires parties to certify that they have redacted CPIs from any docu-
ments that they have submitted to the court.
154
  But a certification 
requirement may not be potent enough to deter negligent filing.  
The Rule is unclear about the consequences of providing certifica-
tion without proper redaction.  Two outcomes are likely to result 
from this ambiguity.  First, courts could choose to adopt the proce-
dure established in Rule 1:4-8.
155
  Rule 1:4-8 states that by signing the 
 
court unless otherwise required by statute, rule, administrative directive, or court or-
der . . . .”). 
 151 See Jonathan J. Darrow & Stephen D. Lichtenstein, “Do You Really Need My Social 
Security Number?” Data Collection Practices in the Digital Age, 10 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 1, 12–
13 (2008) (discussing how the Internet eases the process of data aggregation and 
significantly increases the opportunity for identity theft); Identity Theft, THE NAT’L 
CTR. FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, http://www.ncvc.org/ncvc/main.aspx?dbName 
=DocumentViewer&DocumentID=32359#5 (last visited Dec. 25, 2010) (discussing 
the effects of identity theft on victims, including poor credit status, time and effort to 
correct mistakes, costs, and psychological scars).  
 152 See R. 1:38-7 (requiring the redaction of personal identifiers from all docu-
ments submitted to the court); see also ADMINISTRATIVE DETERMINATIONS, supra note 5, 
at 1 (indicating that some personal identifiers should remain confidential and 
should be redacted from court documents). 
 153 See R. 1:38-7(c) (declaring that a party must avoid placing CPIs in court docu-
ments, and requiring parties to certify pleadings and Case Information Statements in 
accordance with the redaction requirements); see also REPORT, supra note 7, at 11 
(“Court staff should not be required to redact confidential personal identifiers in ex-
isting court records or included in court records filed in the future . . . .”). 
 154 If a Case Information Statement is required, it must include a certification 
statement indicating that CPIs have been redacted.  R. 1:38-7(c)(1).  If no Case In-
formation Statement is required, parties must, in the first filed pleading, include the 
language, “I certify that confidential personal identifiers have been redacted from 
documents now submitted to the court, and will be redacted from all documents 
submitted in the future in accordance with Rule 1:38-7(b).”  Id. R. 1:38-7(c)(2). 
 155 N.J. CT. R. 1:4-8 (1994).  This Rule governs frivolous litigation in the form and 
execution of papers.  Id. 
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document, the attorney certifies that he has read the document and 
that the information is accurate.
156
  If no signature appears or if the 
signed document contains deficiencies, the document is stricken and 
an adverse party or the court may seek sanctions.
157
  In the case of a 
party’s failure to redact information in violation of the certification 
requirement, courts could apply a similar rationale to Rule 1:4-8 and 
equate the certification with the signature of approval of the truth-
fulness and accuracy of the document.  Alternatively, a client injured 
as a result of an attorney’s failure to redact the proper CPIs might file 
a legal malpractice claim against the negligent attorney. 
The problem with these two alternatives is their restrictiveness.  
For instance, Rule 1:4-8 benefits only the parties because the parties 
are the sole entities—aside from the court itself—in a position to 
make a motion to impose court-ordered sanctions.
158
  Rule 1:4-8 does 
not adequately protect third parties who, quite conceivably, are in-
jured by an attorney’s failure to redact their confidential information.  
Similarly, malpractice claims are obviously deficient if the individual 
affected by the release of the confidential information is not the at-
torney’s client but is in fact a third party.
159
 
An enforcement provision specific to the failure to redact in ac-
cordance with Rule 1:38 might remedy the inadequacies of the certi-
fication requirement and provide stronger protections.  Unlike Rule 
1:4-8 or a legal malpractice claim, the enforcement provision could 
be available not only to clients and parties but also to other persons 
involved in the litigation and third persons affected by the non-
compliant party’s negligence.
160
  This would ensure protection, or at 
least recourse, for the personal information of witnesses and victims 
 
 156 N.J. CT. R. 1:4-8(a). 
 157 N.J. CT. R. 1:4-8(a)–(b). 
 158 N.J. CT. R. 1:4-8(a).  Although courts may order sanctions sua sponte, they may 
be unwilling to do so for any number of reasons. 
 159 The New Jersey Supreme Court has loosened the privity requirement obstruct-
ing many third-party legal malpractice suits, and held that an attorney has a limited 
duty to specific non-clients.  Petrillo v. Bachenberg, 655 A.2d 1354, 1357–59 (N.J. 
1995).  The duty extends to third parties whom the attorney should have known 
would rely on the lawyer’s professional work.  Id. at 1359.  A third party affected by 
the attorney’s failure to redact would unlikely qualify as a non-client to whom the at-
torney owes a specific duty, which is a necessary element to assert a legal malpractice 
claim. 
 160 Cf. R. 1:4-8(a)–(b) (stipulating that only an adverse party or the court can raise 
the prospect of sanctions); see supra note 159 and accompanying text. 
MAKAR_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/16/2011  2:58 PM 
1100 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:1071 
identified in the court record.
161
  By expanding the reach of the re-
daction requirements and the potential liability risks, the enforce-
ment provision might deter carelessness and encourage attentiveness.  
An enforcement provision is an especially relevant concern because 
the results of a pilot study performed in the federal courts, which au-
thorized remote electronic access to criminal case records, revealed 
that a redaction requirement similar to Rule 1:38’s requirement was a 
disaster to implement.
162
  In fact, in certain circumstances, the expe-
rience resulted in complete failure to redact any confidential infor-
mation from documents posted online.
163
  Rather than comply with 
the redaction requirements, some courts merely added exceptions to 
the list of documents excluded from online access because redaction 
was simply too difficult.
164
  Defense attorneys in several districts re-
ported that courts often waived sanctions for a party’s failure to re-
dact.
165
 
Including appropriate penalties in the enforcement provision is 
important in order to grant significance to the redaction require-
ments.  For example, the enforcement provision might resemble the 
sanctions embodied in N.J. Court Rule 1:20-15A, which governs at-
torney misconduct and discipline.
166
  One such sanction may include 
reprimand or admonition, but more serious or repetitive violations 
could result in censure or suspension from the bar.
167
  Other penalties 
might include sanctions similar to those established in Rule 1:4-8, in-
cluding monetary payments to the court or to the victim.
168
  Addition-
ally, the enforcement provision should include language that a show-
ing of actual harm caused by the exposure is not necessary and that 
any penalties are prophylactic, available merely on the basis that in-
formation required to be redacted under Rule 1:38 was not in fact 
 
 161 The names and addresses of victims or alleged victims of domestic abuse or 
sexual offenses are statutorily excluded from public access.  N.J. CT. R. 1:38-3(c)(12) 
(2009). 
 162 RAUMA, supra note 49, at 12–14. 
 163 Id. 
 164 Id. 
 165 Id. 
 166 N.J. CT. R. 1:20-15A (2009) (describing sanctions and conditions for disciplin-
ing members of the bar). 
 167 See N.J. CT. R. 1:20-15A (3)–(6) (listing examples of possible sanctions for at-
torney misconduct). 
 168 N.J. CT. R. 1:4-8(b) (1994).  As mentioned previously, Rule 1:4-8 is itself insuffi-
cient to protect victims from an attorney’s negligent failure to redact CPIs.  See supra 
note 158 and accompanying text.  But, the type of sanctions listed in the Rule pro-
vides a possible framework for the creation of an enforcement provision. 
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redacted.  Requiring victims to show actual harm to punish negligent 
attorneys and litigants who violated a court rule is insulting. 
B. RESTRICTING INTERNET ACCESS TO COURT-GENERATED 
DOCUMENTS ONLY 
Another consequence of New Jersey’s transition towards remote 
electronic access to court documents is the possibility of increased lit-
igation, particularly in the form of sealing motions.
169
  Conceivably, 
parties worried about shielding their information from public viewer-
ship on the Internet will run to courts to request sealing orders.  Even 
with the redaction requirements, the category of CPIs is quite limited, 
and embarrassing and sensitive information will most likely fall out-
side the reach of the redaction requirements.  In the past, parties re-
lied on practical obscurity to protect their interests,
170
 mitigating the 
need for greater protections beyond the occasional sealing orders re-
quested for particularly sensitive information.  But as the Internet 
threatens to erode practical obscurity, the litigation strategy is chang-
ing and forcing parties to pursue additional judicial mechanisms to 
protect information that was, at one time, virtually hidden from pub-
lic inspection. 
Rule 1:38 establishes a lofty standard to seal records, which fur-
ther complicates the problem.  The test requires the existence of 
good cause, which is present only when disclosure will cause a serious 
and specific injury and the individual’s privacy substantially outweighs 
the public’s right to access.
171
  While this standard essentially codifies 
the prior common law test,
172
 it may theoretically result in a stricter 
standard because the Rule now expresses an absolute presumption of 
openness unless exempted.  Moreover, the Rule provides for an un-
sealing procedure and places the burden on the proponent to prove 
that good cause still exists to justify maintaining the seal.
173
 
 
 169 See Winn, supra note 48, at 326. 
 170 Id. at 316 (“The ‘practical obscurity’ of old records generates an expectation of 
privacy that has been recognized as legitimate by common law courts.”). 
 171 N.J. CT. R. 1:38-11(a)–(b) (2009). 
 172 REPORT, supra note 7, at 9. 
 173 N.J. CT. R. 1:38-12.  The “reverse burden” was adopted by the court based on 
its decision in Hammock.  REPORT, supra note 7, at 44.  In Hammock, the court deter-
mined that  
[t]he person with the burden of proof [the proponent for continued 
sealing] must present evidence to show why public access to the docu-
ments should be denied currently rather than rely on the fact that a 
protective order was entered earlier.  When a person intervenes in a 
case to inspect and copy documents that have been sealed, a reassess-
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With a more stringent sealing standard and the threat of public 
exposure looming large, two circumstances are likely to occur.  First, 
parties may fail to make a complete record to preserve their privacy.
174
  
This raises due process concerns about the right to a fair trial when a 
party must choose between privacy and fairness.  Second, parties with 
adequate resources might turn to private forums, including ADR al-
ternatives, to settle their disputes.
175
  While this scenario may lighten 
the courts’ workloads, particularly as courts are already overcrowded 
and overburdened, the negative consequences outweigh the benefits.  
Specifically, this situation presents concerns about economic discrim-
ination and threatens the integrity of the judicial system.
176
  If a con-
sequence of the Rule is that it promotes the use of private resolution 
mechanisms because the public feels that the courts are inadequate 
to protect its interests, then the public trust in the judiciary is nega-
tively affected.  This is perverse because the goal of the Rule is to in-
crease judicial transparency and public confidence in courts.
177
 
One solution to combat the increase in sealing motions and the 
migration to private forums is to restrict Internet access to court-
generated documents only, including opinions, judgments, dockets, 
indexes, and calendars.
178
  Many courts, including the New Jersey state 
courts, already post some of these documents on their websites.
179
  
The benefit of this compromise is two-fold: it preserves judicial trans-
parency and balances individual privacy rights.  In particular, it would 
 
ment of whether documents should remain under seal must be based 
on a current justification for privacy.   
Hammock v. Hoffmann-Laroche, Inc., 662 A.2d 546, 559 (N.J. 1995) (emphasis add-
ed). 
 174 See Salzmann, supra note 74, at 377 (“Individuals will be hard pressed to release 
personal information to the government if they believe that information will be dis-
tributed around the world.”). 
 175 Marder, supra note 85, at 444–45. 
 176 See text accompanying note 84. 
 177 See REPORT, supra note 7, at 30, 44 (declaring that transparency is the guiding 
principle supporting the Rule and that public trust and confidence in the judiciary is 
only achieved through open access to court documents).  
 178 See Sudbeck, supra note 80, at 119–20 (arguing to restrict Internet access to 
court-generated documents only because such a policy would still demonstrate to the 
public how the judiciary is functioning, which is one of the central tenets of the pub-
lic access doctrine). 
 179 REPORT, supra note 7, at 25 (noting that since its launch in 1995, the Judiciary 
Website includes decisions of all New Jersey state courts, “the Rules of the Court, jury 
charges, legal forms, and step-by-step kits for self-represented litigants”).  For exam-
ples of the materials, see New Jersey Courts, N.J. JUDICIARY, 
http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/ (last visited Mar. 22, 2011). 
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protect the long-established expectation of practical obscurity
180
 and 
discourage parties from zealously seeking sealing orders or resorting 
to private forums.  Additionally, this recommendation is consistent 
with the presumption of openness because the entire case file would 
remain available at the courthouse.
181
  For further review, the inter-
ested public could still opt to travel to the courthouse to retrieve the 
complete paper record. 
C. Questions of Timing 
1. Limiting the Time Frame for Release to Records Filed 
After September 1, 2009 
One of the unanswered questions evinced in the wake of Rule 
1:38’s ambiguities concerns the timing for Internet posting.  The rec-
ommendations pronounce that the redaction requirements for CPIs 
apply prospectively.
182
  Neither the Rule nor the recommendations 
address whether and to what extent courts will place old records on 
the Internet without the protections offered by the redaction re-
quirements.  Prior to the enactment of amended Rule 1:38 in July 
2009, parties did not necessarily expect to discover their cases files 
displayed on the Internet, and therefore, parties may have relied on 
practical obscurity in lieu of taking more proactive steps to protect 
their private information, such as seeking to seal certain docu-
ments.
183
 
One possible resolution is to limit the time frame for release.  
Specifically, the guidelines should clarify that court records filed be-
fore September 1, 2009—the effective date of amended Rule 1:38
184
—
are not eligible for Internet posting.  Not only would posting prior 
records compromise expectations of privacy, but it would also place 
 
 180 See Sudbeck, supra note 80, at 121 (“Requiring the public to access these files in 
the courthouse rather than in their living room will provide some protection to this 
public information, as is currently provided by the concept of the ‘practical obscuri-
ty’ of these files in the clerks’ offices.”). 
 181 Id. at 119–20 (advocating for courts to permit electronic public access to all 
documents at public terminals located in the courthouse, which eases public accessi-
bility and administrative convenience). 
 182 REPORT, supra note 7, at 11. 
 183 Although the Supreme Court of New Jersey adopted the recommendations of 
the Information Systems Policy Committee in 1996, which implicated the judiciary’s 
desire to expand the public access doctrine to include the Internet, the technologi-
cal reality at the time was dubious.  Id. at 26–27.  Therefore, parties likely would still 
suspect that their private information would continue to be hidden by practical ob-
scurity. 
 184 ADMINISTRATIVE DETERMINATIONS, supra note 5, at 1. 
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burdens on court personnel to transform paper records into elec-
tronic form or electronic records into compatible data forms.
185
  Ad-
ditionally, parties have not been required to redact prior records, and 
forcing upon court personnel the overwhelming task to sift through 
prior records to redact sensitive information is plainly contrary to the 
Rule’s designation of redaction burdens.
186
  In the worst-case scena-
rio, courts could post prior records containing personal identifiers, 
which would certainly lead to abuse and criminal mischief.  Again, 
this recommendation will not compromise the public access doctrine 
because prior records will remain available in full at the courthouse. 
2. Establishing a Time Schedule that Permits Immediate 
Remote Electronic Access to Limited Documents upon 
Filing 
Another timing concern involves determining at what stage in 
the proceedings courts will be required to release particular docu-
ments.  For instance, if the presumption of openness applies imme-
diately upon filing, then courts must make documents available in 
real time for public inspection in the courthouse or over the Inter-
net.
187
  This would permit access prior to any actual proceedings tak-
ing place, at least with respect to pleadings, discovery, and pre-trial 
motions.  One major concern is that premature release will create 
pre-trial publicity and prejudice the jury.
188
  This prospect threatens 
the integrity of the court process, and it impinges upon the founding 
principles of fairness and justice.
189
  Because of the concern about the 
spread of pretrial information, applying the same timing principle for 
both paper and electronic records is appropriate.  This notion, how-
 
 185 See Daniel J. Lynch, Litigation: Assessing the Electronic Case Filing Experience in the 
District of New Hampshire, 47 N.H. BUS. J. 12, 16 (2006) (discussing how electronic fil-
ing has increased the time-intensive workload of intake and case managers, particu-
larly because court personnel must scan and upload paper records into the computer 
system to create an electronic docket).  The question is whether this would even be 
practicable, particularly for county courts, which are already overtaxed with their 
current workloads.  
 186 See REPORT, supra note 7, at 16 (“Court staff should not be required to redact 
confidential personal identifiers in existing court records or included in court 
records filed in the future . . . .”). 
 187 For example, the federal PACER system posts case information on its Internet 
server in real time, once the information is updated in a court’s case management 
system.  Frequently Asked Questions, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 
http://pacer.psc.uscourts.gov/faq.html#AR6 (click on “Case Related” tab and then 
“How Soon after a document is filed will it be in PACER?”) (last visited Dec. 25, 
2010).  For more information on the PACER system, see infra note 201.   
 188 Carpinello, supra note 82, at 1108.  
 189 See id. 
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ever, is more pressing in light of Internet accessibility because of the 
relative ease and simplicity with which potential jurors and news 
broadcasters could access such information.
190
  The results create a 
serious interference with justice and hinder the ability of courts to 
perform their duties effectively.  In addition, if courts release the 
records immediately upon filing, parties do not have any lag time to 
seek a motion to seal sensitive information or correct mistakes.  Once 
released, the damaging information is available to the entire public, 
regardless of whether the information was eligible for sealing under 
Rule 1:38. 
Three possible sets of time schedules exist to guide courts.  First, 
courts could release documents immediately upon filing.  As pre-
viously noted, this is inadequate to protect the case from pretrial ex-
posure.
191
  Another approach is to release all records, both at the 
courthouse and on the Internet, only after final adjudication of the 
matter.  This time schedule provides lag time for the parties to make 
a motion to seal information they hope to protect before courts re-
lease it to the public.  This answer is not without tribulations, howev-
er, because cases today are heavily motion-based and the stages lead-
ing to the trial are quite prolonged.
192
  Unless the motion is 
dispositive, such as a summary judgment motion, courts may not re-
lease the case records for a substantial period of time after the parties 
file their initial pleadings.
193
  A third middle-ground approach would 
require courts to release records available at the courthouse imme-
diately upon filing while delaying the release of the entire record on 
the Internet, possibly until final disposition.  Courts could release 
certain information, such as court-generated documents, on the In-
ternet immediately.
194
  This approach maintains the presumption of 
openness while alleviating many of the timing concerns because the 
limited online materials immediately provide the interested public 
with enough information to seek complete files at the courthouse.  
 
 190 Flood, supra note 83, at 431; Schwartz, supra note 83. 
 191 See supra notes 82–83, 188 & 190 and accompanying text. 
 192 Statistics from New Jersey indicate that the case processing time from filing to 
disposition for civil cases at the trial level range from 12–24 months, depending on 
the track.  NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, CASE PROCESSING TIME STANDARDS IN STATE 
COURTS, 2007 app. B (2009), available at http://contentdm.ncsconline.org/cgi-
bin/showfile.exe?CISOROOT=/ctadmin&CISOPTR=1409.pdf.  For criminal cases at 
the trial level, the time from complaint to pre-indictment disposition is two months, 
while the time from indictment to post-indictment disposition is four months.  Id.   
 193 See id. (discussing the case processing times in New Jersey trial courts). 
 194 See supra Part V.B. 
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This timing schedule also protects much of the information from hy-
per-dissemination on the Internet prior to final judgment. 
D. Establishing a Fee System to Offset Costs 
Rule 1:38 raises an additional unanswered question regarding 
the creation and maintenance of an Internet database and associated 
costs.  Neither the recommendations nor the provisions of Rule 1:38 
specify how to create and maintain the appropriate databases or how 
the judiciary will fund the project.  The issue of cost arises in a time 
of financial strife and as the State of New Jersey has an outstanding 
debt of nearly $35 million.
195
  The cost issue is significant because it 
ultimately affects the taxpayers and the general public. 
One suggestion to assist with the costs of providing remote elec-
tronic access, advocated by proponents of equal access for paper and 
electronic records, is to privatize the task of creating and maintaining 
the databases.
196
  Privatizing database management, however, leads to 
several different issues, including the extent to which the private 
sponsors might actually restrict access through usage costs and user 
provisions.
197
  Clearly, this would defeat the purpose of the amended 
Rule, which is to open up the channels for public access.
198
 
Another suggestion is to charge user fees for Internet access to 
court documents.
199
  The benefit of access fees is that such fees would 
help the State recover the significant costs involved in creating and 
maintaining the infrastructure necessary to provide Internet accessi-
 
 195 Dustan A. McNichol, A Budget Weighed Down by Old Debt, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 
2009, at NJ1. 
 196 See text accompanying note 70. 
 197 See Gomez-Velez, supra note 98, at 417 (“[T]he primary concern should not be 
in the provision of wider (or ‘jazzier’) public access by private vendors but rather 
should be focused on providing effective access and avoiding circumstances under 
which private vendors might seek to ‘privatize’ and restrict access to public informa-
tion.”); Martin, supra note 37, at 880 (“By leaving court data in the custody of a pri-
vate firm, however, the outsourcing of electronic filing and document management 
systems opens a completely new set of issues around public access . . . .”). 
 198 See REPORT, supra note 7, at 25 (discussing the context for the public access pol-
icy and the amended Rule as requiring an open court system to enhance a democrat-
ic society). 
 199 The Committee considered the question of user fees to help recover the costs 
associated with initiating Internet access, but recommended that the judiciary con-
duct a cost-benefit analysis before making any decision regarding fees.  Id. at 50.  The 
Committee determined that the records should be posted without charge until such 
analysis is performed, at which time the judiciary should revisit the question of user 
fees.  Id. 
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bility.
200
  Additionally, charging a modest access fee will likely deter 
mischievous and casual perusal while still providing access to inter-
ested individuals.  An example of a successful fee system is the federal 
PACER system.
201
  PACER charges users $0.08 per page that results 
from any search, and the fee applies irrespective of whether or not 
the user views, prints, or downloads the pages.
202
 
E. Creating a Login Mechanism 
One additional suggestion that relates generally to guide the 
process of providing remote electronic access to court documents is 
to permit access only to those users who have registered and received 
a username and password.  The login mechanism has two benefits: it 
creates an electronic trail to track viewers in case a problem does 
arise,
203
 and it deters wandering eyes from viewing sensitive informa-
tion with the intent to abuse it.  Again, the PACER system provides an 
appropriate example of what a login procedure might entail.  PACER 
requires a user to register with their personal information to obtain 
login and password information necessary to access the Internet post-
ings.
204
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
As technology continues to develop, federal and state courts 
must decide how technology will affect public access rights.  The in-
troduction of the Internet into the public access doctrine amplifies 
the inherent tension between public access rights and individual pri-
vacy rights in the context of First Amendment and common law right 
 
 200 See D. MASS. R. 4.5 app. A (2007) (installing an electronic-public access fee 
schedule, in accordance with Congress and the Judicial Conference, mandating fed-
eral courts to charge user fees to fund and provide electronic access to the PACER 
system); Alabama State Bar, AOC Now Charges AlaCourt Subscribers Per-Page Fee, 70 ALA. 
LAW. 139, 139 (2009) (indicating that Alabama state courts must now charge a fee for 
electronic access to court documents because the combination of electronic storage 
and budgetary constraints is cost prohibitive without generating such funds). 
 201 Public Access to Court Electronic Records Overview, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. 
COURTS, http://pacer.psc.uscourts.gov/pacerdesc.html (last visited Dec. 25, 2010).  
PACER is the federal version of an electronic-public access service permitting users 
to access court documents over the Internet.  Id. 
 202 Frequently Asked Questions, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 
http://www.pacer.gov/psc/faq.html  (click on the “How much does PACER cost? 
link) (last visited Feb. 19, 2011). 
 203 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE, supra note 64, at 6. 
 204 Public Access to Court Electronic Records, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 
http://www.pacer.gov/ (click on the “How Do I Access PACER” tab) (last visited 
Mar. 22, 2011). 
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of access claims.  When courts post documents on the Internet, it ex-
acerbates the opportunity for hyper-dissemination and misuse of the 
information as compared to the practical obscurity protecting docu-
ments available at the courthouse.  In several opinions, the Supreme 
Court of the United States has insinuated that the analysis requires 
different privacy rights and varying levels of privacy as technology al-
ters the legal landscape in the public access doctrine. 
In July 2009, the Supreme Court of New Jersey adopted 
amended Rule 1:38 and approved the recommendations promulgat-
ed by its self-appointed Committee thereby fundamentally altering its 
public access doctrine.  The amended Rule’s explicit, absolute pre-
sumption of openness unless specifically exempted, fashions unans-
wered questions and specific consequences that the supreme court 
must address as it endeavors to create a policy for posting court doc-
uments on the Internet.  Although the Rule does not address Inter-
net posting explicitly in its provisions, the recommendations ap-
proved by the court urge the judiciary to begin posting certain doc-
uments online for remote electronic access by the public leaving it to 
the court to construct policy guidelines to govern Internet acces-
sibility. 
Because traditional access to court documents at the courthouse 
differs from remote electronic access over the Internet and because 
the policy is relatively undefined, several unanswered questions and 
consequences arise that the court must address when it implements 
its policies to balance public access rights and privacy rights.  The 
questions and consequences focus on the enforcement of the redac-
tion requirements, increased litigation burdening courts, the timing 
schedules for release of court documents over the Internet, and the 
costs of providing Internet accessibility.  This Comment made rec-
ommendations and proposed solutions to these issues, including ad-
vocating for the creation of an enforcement provision for failure to 
redact, maintaining a policy of posting only court-generated docu-
ments online, creating an appropriate time schedule for release, 
charging user fees to offset costs, and requiring a login procedure 
with username and password information. 
By considering these recommendations and resolutions, the 
court will ensure a healthy balance between public access rights and 
individual privacy rights even in the face of technological advance-
ments.  In response to Dr. Malcolm’s warning, venture capitalist John 
Hammond retorted, “How could we stand the light of discovery and 
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not act?”
205
  Unfortunately, the law is not as idealistic as a line in a 
movie. 
 
 
 205 JURASSIC PARK (Universal Pictures 1993). 
